Tax havens: Features, operations and solving tax evasion problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
value added tax and tax evasion
The phenomenon of tax evasion has been always one of the most major issues among economists due to it's devastating effects on the economy and the process of economic development. Many scholars have always sought to provide solutions to reduce and limit tax evasion. The introduction of the VAT system can be seen as a milestone in the area of economic transparency and tax evasion, which refers t...
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⁎ Corresponding author. Stephen M. Ross School of Bu 701 Tappan Street, Rm. R5396, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1 936 3914; fax: +734 936 8716. E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Slemrod). 1 The OECD report distinguished tax havens from significant revenues from the income tax but have prefe kinds of income, generally restricted to non-residents; about the kind of tax haven covered by the OECD's def...
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This note presents a simple, partial equilibrium model of the supply of offshore tax havens, when multinationals are capable of sheltering some of their worldwide income. It provides a few contrasting predictions to those in “Tax Competition with Parasitic Tax Havens” by Slemrod and Wilson. Slemrod and Wilson model tax sheltering as a production process which uses up scarce resources in the tax...
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All opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not those of the Economics Education and Research Consortium Research dissemination by the EERC may include views on policy, but the EERC itself takes no institutional policy positions This paper considers the problem of determining the optimal taxation for a group of individuals with random, independent and identically distributed income...
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In this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of pro t shifting towards tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforcement levels may be too high due to negative scal externalities. In contrast, under formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive externalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contrib...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Skola biznisa
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1451-6551,2406-1301
DOI: 10.5937/skolbiz2-12411