Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?

Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?

We analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings. Governments are able to commit to long-run tax discrimination policies before firms’ decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non-cooperatively. Whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted to mobile firms is bene...

Tax competition when firms choose their

We analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries when firms can invest in a multinational structure that confers tax savings. Governments are able to commit to long-run tax discrimination policies before firms’ decisions are made and before statutory capital tax rates are chosen non-cooperatively. Whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted to mobile firms is bene...

Multinational Firms Mitigate Tax Competition

An increase in the taxation of foreign affi liates reduces domestic investment, as has recently been empirically shown in Becker and Riedel (2012). This paper investigates the implication of this finding for tax competition. It is shown that an increase in the number of multinational firms (in contrast to purely national firms) may actually mitigate tax competition — counter to the popular opin...

Tax Competition with and without Tax Discrimination against Domestic Firms

State doctors choose their tax weapons.