Tax competition and the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model
This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capit...
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A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare assessment. We find that the inefficiency in the voting equilibrium is the lower, the higher the average level of...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Urban Economics
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0094-1190
DOI: 10.1016/s0094-1190(03)00037-8