Tariffs, Quotas, and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information*
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tariffs, Quotas and Forward Contracts under Asymmetric Information
We consider optimal trade policy for a large country with private information. We show that the optimal tariff leads to a signaling equilibrium with higher tariffs and lower welfare than under complete information, whereas the optimal import quota replicates the complete information equilibrium and thus is superior to the tariff. We also show that, with the tariff, the country may be better off...
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Optimal tariffs and quotas are comgared for a large country under uncertainty. If the import supply schedule has constant elastjcity and is subject to multiplicative uncertainty and domestic demand is random then the optimal policy is a fixed +.d valorem tariff. If the supply schedule has constant elasticity but this elasticity is random then the optimal tariff is superior to the optimal quota....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of International Economics
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0965-7576,1467-9396
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2005.00506.x