Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities

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چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics

سال: 2017

ISSN: 0304-4068

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.04.002