منابع مشابه
Impact of Takeover Defenses on Managerial
The article studies how takeover defenses influence managerial incentives with respect to long term investments, excess liquidity and the amount of debt relative to equity. The article conducts a cross-sectional regression based on a sample of Danish listed firms, dealing explicitly with the problem of causation between the variables. Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist of ...
متن کاملManagerial Performance, Bid Premiums, and the Characteristics of Takeover Targets
This paper tests the inefficient performance hypothesis and the pre-bid runup premium hypothesis of hostile takeovers. The long-term and short-term performance and the characteristics of friendly and hostile takeovers are compared. We find no indications of poor target performance over the five years prior to the takeover announcement. However, there is evidence that hostile takeovers do perfor...
متن کاملFree Cash Flow and Takeover Threats: An Experimental Study∗
A classic theory of corporate governance holds that, when cash flow is high and investment opportunities scarce, takeover threats reduce managerial self dealing and encourage dividend payment to owners. We conduct laboratory experiments studying the effect of cash flow on self dealing and the effect of takeover threats on both agency problems and the optimality of management of cash flows. We f...
متن کاملTakeover Threats, Pricing Strategies and the Dynamics of Information Flows
This paper analyzes the impact of a takeover threat on information flows (or communication) within or across firms. We consider a long-term relationship between a firm and a privately informed trading partner, say a buyer. Both parties bargain over a price in each period and a takeover may take place. When takeovers are ruled out, having high bargaining power increases the firm’s likelihood to ...
متن کاملThe effects of takeover threats on shareholders and firm value
We study the role of takeover threats as a corporate control mechanism using [Aghion, P., Tirole, J., 1997. Formal and real authority in organizations. Journal of Political Economy 105, 1–29] model of formal and real authority. Shareholders do not monitor the manager’s actions since ownership is widely dispersed. A corporate raider may monitor and step in if a profit opportunity exists. In our ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/261524