Tainted Executives as Outside Directors

Outside Directors and Ceo Turnover

‘this paper examines the relation between the monitoring of CEOs by inside aud outside directors and CEO resignations. CEO resignations are predicted using stock returns and earnings changes as measures of prior performance. There is a stronger association between prior performance and the prhability of a resignation for companies with outsider-dominated boards than for companies with insider-d...

Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors:

Outside Directors and Firm Performance during Institutional Transitions

Do outside directors on corporate boards make a difference in firm performance during institutional transitions? What leads to the practice of appointing outside directors in the absence of legal mandate? This article addresses these two important questions by drawing not only on agency theory, but also resource dependence and institutional theories. Taking advantage of China’s institutional tr...

Leading on demand businesses - Executives as architects

Fully exploiting the potential of on demand computing requires on demand business models. To respond “on demand” to the unpredicted opportunities of the moment, a business must invest in knowing earlier the meaning of what is happening now rather than in attempting to forecast better the opportunities of the future. This means concentrating on know-why, which is system knowledge, rather than kn...

Shareholders Should Welcome Employees as Directors

The most influential theory of corporate governance, principal agency theory, does not take into consideration that the key task of modern corporations is to generate and transfer firm-specific knowledge. It proposes that, in order to overcome the widespread corporate scandals, the interests of top management and directors should be increasingly aligned to shareholder interests by making the bo...