Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Tacit Collusion and Capacity Withholding in Repeated Uniform Price Auctions∗
This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when each firm sets a price-quantity pair specifying the firm’s minimum acceptable price and the maximum qu...
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increasing overall liberalization and improving reliability indexes are the two prime but often conflicting objectives of electricity markets. proper embedding of regulatory intervention of price caps provides an effective means to tradeoff between these two objectives. surprisingly, in the context of the infinitely repeated game paradigm, as in the case of actual electricity markets, the domin...
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This paper studies bidder collusion with communication in repeated auctions when no side transfer is possible. It presents a simple dynamic bid rotation scheme with co-ordinates bids based on communication history and enables intertemporal transfer of bidders’ payoffs. The paper derives a sufficient condition for such a dynamic scheme to be an equilibrium and characterises the equilibrium payof...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0741-6261,1756-2171
DOI: 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00125.x