منابع مشابه
Secure and Private Auctions without Auctioneers
Security and privacy have become crucial factors in auction design. Various schemes to ensure the safe conduction of sealed-bid auctions have been proposed recently. We introduce a new standard of security for auctions (“full privacy”), that prevents extraction of bid information despite any collusion of participants. This requirement is stronger than other common assumptions that prohibit the ...
متن کاملبررسی کاریوتیپی چهار گونه آویشن (Thymus spp) T. lancifolius) ،T. daenensis ، T. fedtschenkoi و pubescens T.)
آویشن (Thymus) از تیره Lamiaceae گیاهی است چند ساله که به‌دلیل خاصیت دارویی از اهمیت بالایی برخوردار است. بذرهای پنج جمعیت متعلق به چهار گونه T. Lancifolius،T. daenensis subsp. daenensis (دو نمونه)، T. fedtschenkoiو pubescens .Tکشت گردید و پس از جوانه‌زنی بذرها از مریستم انتهایی ریشه برای مطالعات کاریوتیپی استفاده شد. نتایج نشان داد که تعداد کروموزوم پایه در تمام جمعیت‌های مورد بررسی 15= x اس...
متن کاملDynamic Private Auctions
In auctions knowing the values of bids allows the auctioneer to manipulate the result of an auction, e.g the winner or the price. Hence, one is interested in hiding these values. A cryptographically-secure protocol for electronic auctions has been presented by Naor, Pinkas, and Summer [NPS99]. The principal topic of this work is to extend the protocol of Naor et al. in several ways with a main ...
متن کاملPrivate monitoring in auctions
We study infinitely repeated first-price auctions in which a bidder only learns whether or not he won the object. While repetition of the stage-game equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium in public strategies, with patient bidders there are simple Nash equilibria in private strategies that improve on bid rotation. Sequential rationality is appropriately captured by essentially perfect Bayes...
متن کاملMultidimensional private value auctions
We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes her own private valuation as well as noisy signals about her opponent’s private valuation. In such multidimensional private value auction environments, we show that the revenue equivalence between the first and second price auctions breaks down and there is no definite revenue ranking; while the s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Computer Science and Technology
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1000-9000,1860-4749
DOI: 10.1007/s11390-008-9174-3