Symmetric Equilibria in Stochastic Timing Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Symmetric equilibria in stochastic timing games
We construct subgame-perfect equilibria with mixed strategies for symmetric stochastic timing games with arbitrary strategic incentives. The strategies are qualitatively different for local firstor second-mover advantages, which we analyse in turn. When there is a local second-mover advantage, the players may conduct a war of attrition with stopping rates that we characterize in terms of the Sn...
متن کاملNotes on Equilibria in Symmetric Games
In a symmetric game, every player is identical with respect to the game rules. We show that a symmetric 2strategy game must have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We also discuss Nash’s original paper and its generalized notion of symmetry in games. As a special case of Nash’s theorem, any finite symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, symmetric infinite games with compact...
متن کاملStrongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games
This paper studies strongly symmetric equilibria (SSE) in continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits. SSE payoffs can be studied via two functional equations similar to the HJB equation used for Markov equilibria. This is valuable for three reasons. First, these equations retain the tractability of Markov equilibrium, while allowing for punishments and rewards: the ...
متن کاملMonotonic -equilibria in strongly symmetric games
-equilibrium allows for worse actions to be played with higher probability than better actions. I introduce a refinement that addresses this shortcoming: an -equilibrium is monotonic if each player assigns (weakly) higher probabilities to better actions. This concept is logically independent of strong -equilibrium. I study these refinements of -equilibrium in games with countably many players a...
متن کاملEquilibria in symmetric games: Theory and applications
This article presents a new approach to analyze the equilibrium set of symmetric, differentiable games by separating between multiple symmetric equilibria and asymmetric equilibria. This separation allows to investigate, for example, how various parameter constellations affect the scope for multiple symmetric or asymmetric equilibria, or how the equilibrium set depends on the nature of the stra...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2631870