Switching costs and screening efficiency of incomplete contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d`Economique
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0008-4085,1540-5982
DOI: 10.1111/0008-4085.00052