Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Collusion and discrimination in organizations
In a principal–multi-agent setting we investigate how optimal contracts should be modified under relative performance evaluation when agents collude. Agents may write side-contracts, which are not contingent on their effort choices but indirectly control them through sidetransfers. We show that the optimal collusion-proof contract is to introduce a ‘‘discriminatory policy’’ in the sense that th...
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Ishiguro(2004) shows that discriminatory wage schemes are optimal among collusion-proof contracts under relative performance evaluation when agents collude. However, that analysis depends on the assumption that the agents cannot observe their performances. We investigate how optimal contracts should be modified when the agents observe the realized firm value. We show that the optimal collusion-...
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We analyze a principal-supervisor-two agent hierarchy with supervisory efforts, provide a characterization of the equilibrium of the game, and show which regime improves efficiency between the collusion-proof regime and the lateral collusion one, under the assumptions that the principal is less informed, and that the side-trade is costly. By coping with the trade-off between the value of inform...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105074