Swarming Behavior as Nash Equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nominal Wage Rigidity as a Nash Equilibrium
I would like to thank the FCAR and the SSHRC for generous financial support, and André Kurmann, Louis Phaneuf, and seminar participants at the Université du Québec à Montréal for helpful discussions. The usual caveats apply. Abstract : Models of the microfoundations of nominal price rigidities show that in the absence of real rigidities, individual firms have strong incentives to adjust prices ...
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In game theory, Nash equilibrium (named after John Forbes Nash, who proposed it) is a solution concept of a game involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has anything to gain by changing only his own strategy unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy and no player can benefit by changing his or...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IFAC Proceedings Volumes
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1474-6670
DOI: 10.3182/20120914-2-us-4030.00046