Sustainable corporate governance for environmental innovation: A configurational analysis on board capital, CEO power and ownership structure

نویسندگان

چکیده

CEOs, boards of directors, and owners are believed to be important actors in affecting environmental innovation. Yet, there is a lack combined view on the three literature. This study aims explore sources innovation from perspective corporate governance bundles. Considering interdependent nature three, this proposes configurational model consisting CEO (formal informal) power, board capital (breadth depth), ownership (institutional insider). We undertake qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) sample 250 dirty firms discover six sufficient configurations for high These suggest that multiple paths achieving Furthermore, both powerful weak CEOs can facilitators if they accompanied by suitable archetypes structure.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Business Research

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1873-7978', '0148-2963']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.05.037