Surviving Elections: Election Violence, Incumbent Victory and Post-Election Repercussions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Iskander wins decisive re-election victory
Wiess Col lege junior Marvana I skander swept T u e s d a y ' s S tudent Association pres ident ia l e lec t ions race. Out of a total of 1,362 votes cast in the race, I skande r ob ta ined 809, which co r r e sponded to 59.4 percen t of the vote. She w a s followed by B a k e r C o l l e g e * s o p h o m o r e Hrisl l ikesh Urtl ikar with 10.8 percent of the vote. "I think the ent i re campai...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: British Journal of Political Science
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0007-1234,1469-2112
DOI: 10.1017/s000712341600020x