منابع مشابه
Efficiency and surplus bounds in Cournot competition
We derive bounds on the ratios of deadweight loss and consumer surplus to producer surplus under Cournot competition. To do so, we introduce a parameterization of the degree of curvature of market demand using the parallel concepts of ρ-concavity and ρ-convexity. The more concave is demand, the larger the share of producer surplus in overall surplus, the smaller is consumer surplus relative t...
متن کاملInformation acquisition and full surplus extraction
It is well-known that when agents’ types are correlated, the mechanism designer can extract the entire surplus. This creates an incentive for agents to acquire information about other agents’ types. Robust lotteries (are payment schemes that) support full extraction and partially robust lotteries support efficient implementation in the presence of information acquisition opportunities. Necessar...
متن کاملEx-Post Full Surplus Extraction, Straightforwardly
Consider an estimate of the common value of an auctioned asset that is symmetric in the bidderstypes. Such an estimate can be represented solely in terms of the order statistics of those types. This representation forms the basis for a pricing rule yielding truthful bidding as an equilibrium, whether bidderstypes are a¢ liated or independent. We highlight the link between the estimator and fu...
متن کاملExtraction of the Surplus in Standard Auctions
Crémer and McLean [1] and McAfee and Reny [3] showed that, in “nearly all auctions”, the seller can offer a mechanism that obtains full rent extraction. The mechanism designed by Crémer and McLean differs from standard procedures in several respects. Notably, (a) bidders are required to buy “lotteries” in order to partecipate at the auction; (b) bidders are treated non-anonymously, in the sense...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937x.00183