Surplus equivalence of leveled commitment contracts
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Surplus Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts
In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts — i.e., contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty — were recently shown to improve expected social welfare even if agents decommit strategically in Nash equilibrium. Such contracts differ based on whether agents have to de...
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In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts | i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty|were recently shown to improve expected social welfare even if agents decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Such contracts diier based on whether agents have to declare ...
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In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty were recently shown to improve expected social welfare even if agents decommit insincerely in Nash equilibrium. Such contracts differ based on whether agents have to declare t...
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In automated negotiation systems consisting of self-interested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding. Leveled commitment contracts i.e. contracts where each party can decommit by paying a predetermined penalty were recently shown to improve Pareto efficiency even if agents rationally decommit in Nash equilibrium using inflated thresholds on how good their outside offers must be befo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0004-3702
DOI: 10.1016/s0004-3702(02)00275-8