Supercooperation in evolutionary games on correlated weighted networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Supercooperation in Evolutionary Games on Correlated Weighted Networks
In this work we study the behavior of classical two-person, two-strategies evolutionary games on a class of weighted networks derived from Barabási-Albert and random scale-free unweighted graphs. Using customary imitative dynamics, our numerical simulation results show that the presence of link weights that are correlated in a particular manner with the degree of the link end points leads to un...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Physical Review E
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1539-3755,1550-2376
DOI: 10.1103/physreve.85.016107