Successive duopoly under moral hazard: Will incentive contracts persist?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts and Risk: Evidence from Procurement
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management
سال: 2009
ISSN: 2013-0953
DOI: 10.3926/jiem.2009.v2n1.p208-229