Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium

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چکیده

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Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory

سال: 2009

ISSN: 0022-0531

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2008.05.002