Submodular secretary problem and extensions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Submodular Secretary Problem
Online auction is an essence of many modern markets, particularly networked markets, in which information about goods, agents, and outcomes is revealed over a period of time, and the agents must make irrevocable decisions without knowing future information. Optimal stopping theory, especially the classic secretary problem, is a powerful tool for analyzing such online scenarios which generally r...
متن کاملThe submodular secretary problem under a cardinality constraint and with limited resources
We study the submodular secretary problem subject to a cardinality constraint, in long-running scenarios, or under resource constraints. In these scenarios the resources consumed by the algorithm should not grow with the input size, and the online selection algorithm should be an anytime algorithm. We propose a 0.1933-competitive anytime algorithm, which performs only a single evaluation of the...
متن کاملSubmodular Secretary Problems: Cardinality, Matching, and Linear Constraints
We study various generalizations of the secretary problem with submodular objective functions. Generally, a set of requests is revealed step-by-step to an algorithm in random order. For each request, one option has to be selected so as to maximize a monotone submodular function while ensuring feasibility. For our results, we assume that we are given an offline algorithm computing an α-approxima...
متن کاملConstrained Non-monotone Submodular Maximization: Offline and Secretary Algorithms
Constrained submodular maximization problems have long been studied, most recently in the context of auctions and computational advertising, with near-optimal results known under a variety of constraints when the submodular function is monotone. The case of non-monotone submodular maximization is less well understood: the first approximation algorithms even for the unconstrained setting were gi...
متن کاملThe Secretary Problem
This note reanalyzes a non·zero-sum game version of the secretary problem recently treated by Kurano, Nakagami and Yasuda [3], under a modified formulation of the problem. The equilibrium derived differs from the former one and has an interesting assymptotic behavior which reconfirms a main theorem formerly proved by Presman and Sonin [4]. Th" equilibrium value in the limit is a positive number...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Algorithms
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1549-6325,1549-6333
DOI: 10.1145/2500121