منابع مشابه
ɛ-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games
We introduce the concept of e-consistent equilibrium where each player plays a e-best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an e-consistent equilibrium induces an e-equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of e-consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games w...
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It is known that an equilibrium of an infinitely repeated two-player game (with limit average payoffs) can be computed in polynomial time, as follows: according to the folk theorem, we compute minimax strategies for both players to calculate the punishment values, and subsequently find a mixture over outcomes that exceeds these punishment values. However, for very large games, even computing mi...
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Consider a two-person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and o¤ers each period and collect payo¤s (as function of that periods actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an in nitely-repeated game wherein players can o¤er one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game. Theory is silent regarding how the sur...
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We provide tight bounds on the rate of convergence of the equilibrium payo sets for repeated games under both perfect and imperfect public monitoring. The distance between the equilibrium payo set and its limit vanishes at rate (1− δ)1/2 under perfect monitoring, and at rate (1− δ)1/4 under imperfect monitoring. For strictly individually rational payo vectors, these rates improve to 0 (i.e., al...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Econometrica
سال: 1993
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.2307/2951500