Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
consciousness from the prospect of representational theory of mind
one of the most important questions in epistemology is the nonphysical realities, like phenomenal consciousness. the main claim of physicalism is real explanations of events and properties are only physical explanations and representationalists are agree too. thus these realities can explained by the rule of biases of physical and objective events.on the other hand , phenomenalists maintain tha...
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Though we take mainly a philosophical approach, we hope that the results of our work will be useful to researchers on consciousness who take other approaches. Everyone agrees, no matter what their point of view on consciousness, that consciousness has a representational base. However, there have been relatively few well-worked-out attempts to say what this base might be like. The two best devel...
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Michael Tye has recently argued that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences is “one and the same as” (1) Poised (2) Abstract (3) Non-conceptual (4) Intentional Content (PANIC). Tye argues extensively that PANIC Theory accounts for differences in phenomenal character in representational terms. But another task of a theory of phenomenal consciousness is to account for the difference be...
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In this paper, I claim that extant empirical data do not support a radically embodied understanding of the mind but, instead, suggest (along with a variety of other results) a massively representational view. According to this massively representational view, the brain is rife with representations that possess overlapping and redundant content, and many of these represent other mental represent...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Disputatio
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0873-626X
DOI: 10.2478/disp-2012-0007