Subjective Bayesian beliefs

نویسندگان
چکیده

برای دانلود باید عضویت طلایی داشته باشید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Subjective Beliefs and Schooling Decisions

Subjective Beliefs and Schooling Decisions This paper considers the estimation of sequential schooling decisions made by agents who are endowed with subjective beliefs about their own ability. I use unique Italian panel data which provide information on i) the curvature of the per-period utility function, ii) schooling decisions, iii) post-schooling earnings, in order to estimate the future com...

متن کامل

Subjective Beliefs and Ex Ante Trade 1169

We study a definition of subjective beliefs applicable to preferences that allow for the perception of ambiguity, and provide a characterization of such beliefs in terms of market behavior. Using this definition, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the efficiency of ex ante trade and show that these conditions follow from the fundamental welfare theorems. When aggregate uncertaint...

متن کامل

Cartel Stability with Subjective Detection Beliefs

The condition is derived for Friedman’s trigger strategy to sustain a collusive market equilibrium as a noncooperative Nash equilibrium given subjective beliefs as to the antitrust authority’s ability of succesfully disolving the illegal cartel.

متن کامل

Subjective Beliefs and Ex-Ante Agreeable Trade

We find a necessary and sufficient condition for ex-ante trade when agents are non-expected utility maximizers. The condition is that they share subjective beliefs. Our result holds for a class of convex preferences that contains many functional forms used in applications. In a special case of expected utility, the condition becomes exactly the common prior assumption. It can also be articulate...

متن کامل

Incentives for Subjective Evaluations with Private Beliefs

The modern web critically depends on aggregation of information from self-interested agents, for example opinion polls, product ratings, or crowdsourcing. We consider a setting where multiple objects (questions, products, tasks) are evaluated by a group of agents. We first construct a minimal peer prediction mechanism that elicits honest evaluations from a homogeneous population of agents with ...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

سال: 2015

ISSN: 0895-5646,1573-0476

DOI: 10.1007/s11166-015-9208-5