Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium for Dynamic Pricing Competition with Finite Planning Horizon
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
VERY PRELIMINARY VERSION COMMENTS WELCOME A Notion of Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty by
We define a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for two players, by means of a recursive backward induction procedure. We prove an extension of the Zermelo-von Neumann-Kuhn Theorem for games of perfect information, i. e., that the recursive procedure generates a Nash equilibrium under uncertainty (Dow and Werlang(1994)) of the whole game. We apply the notion for two wel...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4188549