Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria for Stochastic Games
For an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S and compact metric action sets A1, A2, . . . , An, sufficient conditions are given for the existence of subgame perfect equilibria. One result is that such equilibria exist if the law of motion q(·|s, a) is, for fixed s, continuous in a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) for the total variation norm and the payoff functions f1, f2, . . . , fn are bou...
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It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-device in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-devices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies, then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
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Stopping games (without simultaneous stopping) are sequential games in which at every stage one of the players is chosen according to a stochastic process, and that player decides whether to continue the interaction or stop it, whereby the terminal payoff vector is obtained by another stochastic process. We prove that if the payoff process is integrable, a δ-approximate subgame perfect -equilib...
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In previous lectures, we studied Nash Equilibria in normal form games. A strategy is in NE if no single player can gain by deviating from the strategy. In extensive form games the notion of NE remains the same, if no single player can gain by deviating in any way from the actions prescribed to him by the strategy, then the strategy is in NE. The problem in extensive form games is that players a...
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Any stage-game with in nite choice sets can be approximated by nite games obtained as increasingly ner discretizations of the in nite game. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the nite games converge to a limit distribution. We prove that (i) if the limit distribution is feasible in the limit game, then it is also a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the limit game; and (ii) if the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1983
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90076-5