منابع مشابه
Ultimatum Deadlines
A important characteristic of any offer is the deadline at which it expires. We consider an ultimatum deadline game in which the proposer’s decision variable is the offer deadline, while the responder faces a standard finite-horizon search problem. We show that the responder’s strategy is characterized by a shortest acceptable deadline: at the time of deadline, he accepts an offer if the deadli...
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We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information that makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the undominated Nash equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique undominated Nash equilibrium outcome...
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We consider a task, demanding a sequence of efforts, that must be completed by a deadline. Effort is not contractible. Agents face shocks to their opportunity cost of time and are sometimes distracted from work. We show that agents who are often distracted may outperform agents who are distracted less often. The reason is that anticipation of distractions induces agents to start earlier for pre...
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This paper studies safety, progress, and non-zeno properties of Communicating Timed Automata (CTAs), which are timed automata (TA) extended with unbounded communication channels, and presents a procedure to build timed global specifications from systems of CTAs. We define safety and progress properties for CTAs by extending properties studied in communicating finitestate machines to the timed s...
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I introduce irrational types, who are committed to their demands, into a bargaining model with an uncertain deadline for agreement. Rational agents imitate these demands, hoping to benefit from a “tough” reputation. When irrational types are committed to fixed demands and agents are patient, this provides an explanation for “deadline effects” in bargaining: agreement is “U-shaped”, occurring ei...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Microwave Magazine
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1527-3342', '1557-9581']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1109/mmm.2021.3078056