Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice
In the area of legislative choice, social choice theorists have focused on the equilibrium properties of pure majority rule (PMR), operating according to the implicit belief that whatever is true about the PMR mechanism also applies to institutions based upon it. This view has encouraged the study of what seemed to be the general case, thereby avoiding the narrower study of special cases such a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Public Choice
سال: 1981
ISSN: 0048-5829,1573-7101
DOI: 10.1007/bf00133748