Structural symmetry in evolutionary games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Structural symmetry in evolutionary games.
In evolutionary game theory, an important measure of a mutant trait (strategy) is its ability to invade and take over an otherwise-monomorphic population. Typically, one quantifies the success of a mutant strategy via the probability that a randomly occurring mutant will fixate in the population. However, in a structured population, this fixation probability may depend on where the mutant arise...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of The Royal Society Interface
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1742-5689,1742-5662
DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2015.0420