Strongly rational sets for normal-form games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strongly Rational Sets for Normal-Form Games
Curb sets [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991), 141-146] are product sets of pure strategies containing all individual best-responses against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining players. The concept of minimal curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoreti...
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We acknowledge support of National Science Foundation Grant No. SBR-9223701 to the California Institute of Technology and the support of the JPL-Caltech supercomputer project. We thank Barry O'Neill, Richard Boebel, Jack Ochs and Amnon Rapoport for sharing their data. We acknowledge valuable discussions with Mahmoud El-Gamal and Mark Fey, helpful comments at several conference and seminar prese...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory Bulletin
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2196-1085,2196-1093
DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0095-y