Strict robustness to incomplete information
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract We study a strict version of the notion equilibrium robustness by Kajii and Morris (Econometrica 65:1283–1309, 1997) that allows for larger class incomplete information perturbations given complete game, where with high probability, players believe their payoffs are close to (but may be different from) those game. show monotone potential maximizer game is strictly robust if either or associated supermodular, converse also holds in all binary-action supermodular games.
منابع مشابه
Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information
We relax the Kajii and Morris (1997a) notion of equilibrium robustness by allowing approximate equilibria in close incomplete information games. The new notion is termed approximate robustness. The approximately robust equilibrium correspondence turns out to be upper hemicontinuous, unlike the (exactly) robust equilibrium correspondence. As a corollary of the upper hemicontinuity, it is shown...
متن کاملRobustness to Incomplete Information in Repeated Games∗
This paper extends the framework of Kajii and Morris (1997) to study the question of robustness to incomplete information in repeated games. We show that dynamically robust equilibria can be characterized using a one-shot robustness principle that extends the one-shot deviation principle. Using this result, we compute explicitly the set of dynamically robust equilibrium values in the repeated p...
متن کاملIncomplete Information and Robustness in Strategic Environments
Game theoretic modeling involves making assumptions on agents' infinite hierarchies of beliefs. These assumptions are understood to be only approximately satisfied in the actual situation. Thus, the significance of game theoretic predictions depend on robustness properties of the solution concepts adopted. Chapter 1 discusses recent results in this research area and their relations with the res...
متن کاملRobustness to Incomplete Information in Repeated and Dynamic Games
This paper extends Kajii and Morris (1997)’s notion of robustness to incomplete information to repeated and more generally dynamic games. We argue that in dynamic games, the requirements of robustness should be strengthened to allow for small payoff deviations with large probability. Under this strengthening, we show that dynamically robust equilibria can be characterized by applying a one-shot...
متن کاملThe Robustness of Repeated Game Equilibria to Incomplete Payoff Information
We analyse the role of mixed strategies in repeated (and other dynamic) games where players have private information about past events. History-dependent mixed strategies require a player to play distinct continuation strategies σ and σ′ at information sest ω and ω′ respectively, although the player the player is indifferent between these strategies at both information sets. Such equilibria are...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Japanese Economic Review
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1352-4739', '1468-5876']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s42973-023-00136-3