Strict Cost Sharing Schemes for Steiner Forest
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strict Cost Sharing Schemes for Steiner Forest
Gupta et al. [J. ACM, 54 (2007), article 11] and Gupta, Kumar, and Roughgarden [in Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, ACM, New York, 2003, pp. 365– 372] recently developed an elegant framework for the development of randomized approximation algorithms for rent-or-buy network design problems. The essential building block of this framework is an approximation algorithm for t...
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Könemann, Leonardi, and Schäfer [14] gave a 2-budget-balanced and groupstrategyproof mechanism for Steiner forest cost-sharing problems. We prove that this mechanism also achieves an O(log k)approximation of the social cost, where k is the number of players. As a consequence, the KLS mechanism has the smallest-possible worst-case efficiency loss, up to constant factors, among all O(1)-budget-ba...
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Abstract. We consider a game-theoretical variant of the Steiner forest problem in which each player j, out of a set of k players, strives to connect his terminal pair (sj , tj) of vertices in an undirected, edge-weighted graph G. In this paper we show that a natural adaptation of the primaldual Steiner forest algorithm of Agrawal, Klein and Ravi [When trees collide: An approximation algorithm f...
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Consider a scenario where a service is provided to a set of users at a certain net cost. A natural question to ask is, how should one divide the cost amongst the users, i.e., what is a good pricing policy or a cost sharing scheme? Formally, let U be the set of users and C be the cost function that assigns a service cost C(S) to each S ⊆ U . It may help to keep the example of an internet service...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SIAM Journal on Computing
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0097-5397,1095-7111
DOI: 10.1137/090767108