Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Algorithmica
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0178-4617,1432-0541
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-015-0026-6