Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy-Proofness and the Tops-Only Property
A social choice function satisfies the tops-only property if the chosen alternative only depends on each person’s report of his most-preferred alternatives on the range of this function. On many domains, strategyproofness implies the tops-only property, provided that the range of the social choice function satisfies some regularity condition. The existing proofs of this result are model specifi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00349.x