Strategy-proofness and markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy-Proofness for Hospitals in Matching Markets
Strategy-proof implementation is one of the many elements that have contributed to the successful application of matching theory in real life. However, in many-to-one matching markets without transfers (e.g., doctors to hospitals with fixed salaries) there is no stable mechanism which is strategy-proof for hospitals. Furthermore, strategy-proofness and stability cannot be achieved for both hosp...
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This paper studies (single-valued) solutions to housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. I show that a solution is monotonic if and only if it is coalition strategy-proof. I point out that the strong core solution is the only solution which is monotonic, individually rational and an onto function. (As Roth and Postlewaite (1977) showed, the strong core solution is sing...
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Merging operators aim at defining the beliefs/goals of a group of agents from the beliefs/goals of each member of the group. Whenever an agent of the group has preferences over the possible results of the merging process (i.e. the possible merged bases), she can try to rig the merging process by lying on her true beliefs/goals if this leads to a better merged base according to her point of view...
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We extend the Shapley-Scarf (1974) model-where a …nite number of indivisible objects is to be allocated among a …nite number of individuals-to the case where the primary endowment set of an individual may contain none, one, or several objects and where property rights may be transferred (objects inherited) as the allocation process unfolds, under the retained assumption that an individual consu...
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We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked pre...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s003550000056