Strategy-proofness and efficiency in labour production economy with unequal skills

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Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: The Japanese Economic Review

سال: 2019

ISSN: 1352-4739,1468-5876

DOI: 10.1007/s42973-019-00009-8