Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-Quasi-Linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
We consider the problem of allocating objects to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has non-quasi-linear preferences. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where payments influence agents’ abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The “minimum price Walrasian (MPW) rule” is the rule that assigns a minimum pr...
متن کاملSupplement to “ Strategy - proofness and efficiency with non - quasi - linear preferences : A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
Hall’s theorem (Hall 1935). Let N ≡ {1 n} and M ≡ {1 m}. For each i ∈N , let Di ⊆ M . Then there is a one-to-one mapping x′ from N to M such that for each i ∈ N , x′(i) ∈Di if and only if for each N ′ ⊆N , |i∈N ′ Di| ≥ |N ′|. Fact 4 (Mishra and Talman 2010). Let R ⊆ RE and R ∈ Rn. A price vector p is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector for R if and only if no set is overdemanded and no set is ...
متن کاملDiscussion Paper No. 852 STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND EFFICIENCY WITH NONQUASI-LINEAR PREFERENCES: A CHARACTERIZATION OF MINIMUM PRICE WALRASIAN RULE
We consider the problems of allocating several heterogeneous objects owned by governments to a group of agents and how much agents should pay. Each agent receives at most one object and has nonquasi-linear preferences. Nonquasi-linear preferences describe environments in which large-scale payments influence agents’ abilities to utilize objects or derive benefits from them. The “minimum price Wa...
متن کاملStrategy - proofness and Pareto - efficiency in quasi - linear exchange economies ∗
In this paper, we revisit a long-standing question on the structure of strategyproof and Pareto-efficient social choice functions (SCFs) in classical exchange economies (Hurwicz (1972)). Using techniques developed by Myerson in the context of auctiondesign, we show that in a specific quasi-linear domain, every Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof SCF satisfying non-bossiness and a mild continuit...
متن کاملA strategy-proofness characterization of majority rule
A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let LC (resp., ℘C) denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2786789