Strategy-Proof Location of Public Facilities
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location Games with Many Facilities
This paper is devoted to the location of public facilities in a metric space. Selfish agents are located in this metric space, and their aim is to minimize their own cost, which is the distance from their location to the nearest facility. A central authority has to locate the facilities in the space, but she is ignorant of the true locations of the agents. The agents will therefore report their...
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A location function on a finite graph takes a set of most preferred locations (vertices of the graph) for a set of users, and returns a set of locations satisfying conditions meant to please the entire user set as much as possible. A strategyproof location function is one for which it never benefits a user to report a suboptimal preferred location. We introduce four versions of strategy-proof a...
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We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents’ single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We ...
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A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a pro le of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-e¢ ciency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2690140