Strategy-proof approximation mechanisms for an obnoxious facility game on networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Parameterization of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in the Obnoxious Facility Game
In the obnoxious facility game, a location for an undesirable facility is to be determined based on the voting of selfish agents. Design of group strategy proof mechanisms has been extensively studied, but it is known that there is a gap between the social benefit (i.e., the sum of individual benefits) by a facility location determined by any group strategy proof mechanism and the maximum socia...
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In the problem of obnoxious facility location, an obnoxious facility is located in an area. To maximize the social welfare, e.g., the sum of distances from all the agents to the facility, we have to get the true locations of each agent. However, each agent may misreport his/her location to stay far away from the obnoxious facility. In this paper, we design strategy-proof mechanisms on locating ...
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In this paper, we study the (group) strategy-proofness of deterministic mechanisms in the obnoxious facility game. In this game, given a set of strategic agents in a metric, we design a mechanism that outputs the location of a facility in the metric based on the locations of the agents reported by themselves. The benefit of an agent is the distance between her location and the facility and the ...
متن کاملPlacing an Obnoxious Facility in Geometric Networks
In this paper we consider several different problems of placing an obnoxious facility on geometric networks. In particular, our main results show how to obtain efficient polynomial time algorithms for locating an obnoxious facility on the given network under various distance functions such as maximizing the total sum of distances or maximizing the smallest of the distances from the facility to ...
متن کاملStrategy-Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location Games with Many Facilities
This paper is devoted to the location of public facilities in a metric space. Selfish agents are located in this metric space, and their aim is to minimize their own cost, which is the distance from their location to the nearest facility. A central authority has to locate the facilities in the space, but she is ignorant of the true locations of the agents. The agents will therefore report their...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0304-3975
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2011.11.041