Strategies for applying carbon trading to the new energy vehicle market in China: An improved evolutionary game analysis for the bus industry

Application of carbon trading on the consumption-side to subsidize NEVs (called “carbon subsidy (CTS)”) is expected become successor policy for phasing-out purchase subsidy, but there still a gap between practice and theory in how apply. This study applies CTS bus industry addresses interaction problem decision operators policy-implementation government, improves evolutionary game by considering incentive effects strategies within same group discuss stable each parties. Simulation experiments are conducted validate correctness improved model investigate key parameters evolution behaviors. The results show that effect different prices varies significantly under cost gaps new energy buses (NEBs) fuel (FBs), an optimal price range, i.e. 0.163–0.263 CNY/kg this research. initial quota less than close emissions FB can achieve effect. Maintaining high-frequency inspections ensure smooth proliferation NEBs. Finally, recommendations implement proposed stages reduction