Strategic wage bargaining, labor market volatility, and persistence

Strategic Wage Bargaining, Labor Market Volatility, and Persistence

This paper modifies the standard Mortensen-Pissarides job matching model in order to explain the cyclical behavior of vacancies and unemployment. The modifications include strategic wage bargaining (Hall and Milgrom, 2006) and convex labor adjustment costs. The results reveal that our model replicates the cyclical behavior of both variables remarkably well. First, we show that strategic wage ba...

Matching, Bargaining, and Wage Setting in an Evolutionary Model of Labor Market and Output Dynamics

In this paper, we present an agent-based, evolutionary, model of outputand labormarket dynamics. Firms produce a homogeneous, perishable good under constant returns to scale using labor only. Labor productivities are firm-specific and change stochastically due to technical progress. The key feature of the model resides in an explicit microfoundation of the processes of: (i) matching between fir...

Globalization and labor market outcomes: Wage bargaining, search frictions, and firm heterogeneity

Globalization and Labor Market Outcomes: Wage Bargaining, Search Frictions, and Firm Heterogeneity We introduce search unemployment à la Pissarides into Melitz’ (2003) model of trade with heterogeneous firms. We allow wages to be individually or collectively bargained and analytically solve for the equilibrium. We find that the selection effect of trade influences labor market outcomes. Trade l...

Immigration, Labor Market and Wage Inequality

Wage Inequality in a Frictional Labor Market

Wage inequality in the United States has grown substantially in the past two decades. Standard supply-demand analysis in the empirics of inequality (e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992)) indicates that we may attribute some of this trend to an outward shift in the demand for high skilled labor. In this paper we examine a simple static channel in which the wage premium for skill may grow increased firm e...