Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multidimensional Voting under Uncertainty ∗
The nonexistence of equilibria in platform setting games with mutliple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper we relax the stardard assumption that parties either have perfect information about the electorate or that they behave as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties are instead uncertainty averse. What is more,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2075-2180
DOI: 10.4204/eptcs.297.17