Strategic voting in the lab: compromise and leader bias behavior
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Altruism, Turnout and Strategic Voting Behavior
We consider the problem of costly voting in a game-theoretic framework where agents are altruistic. We show that if, as usual, agentstypes are assumed to be independently and identically distributed, the classical theorem of Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal (1985) on the impossibility of large-scale turnout essentially survives, despite the introduction of altruism. We solve this problem...
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چکیده هدف از پژوهش حاضر بررسی رابطه کیفیت زندگی کاری و رفتار شهروندی سازمانی در مدارس مقطع متوسطه پسرانه شهر تهران از دیدگاه دبیران بود. روش پژوهش حاضر توصیفی و از نوع همبستگی بود. از بین دبیران مدارس شهر تهران تعداد 380 نفر به روش نمونه گیری خوشه ای چند مرحله ای به عنوان نمونه پژوهش انتخاب شدند و با تکمیل پرسشنامه ی کیفیت زندگی کاری والتون(1975) و پرسشنامه ی رفتار شهروندی سازمانی پودساکو...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1387-2532,1573-7454
DOI: 10.1007/s10458-020-09446-x