Strategic trade policy with incompletely informed policymakers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Export Subsidies versus Export Quotas with Incompletely Informed Policy Makers ∗
This paper analyzes export subsidies (price incentives) and export quotas (quantity controls) in the Brander-Spencer (1985) model when policy makers have limited information on demand and cost structures. We examine necessary or sufficient information for policy makers to determine the right policies. It is crucial that they know the elasticity values of the slope of the inverse demand curve an...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of International Economics
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0022-1996
DOI: 10.1016/s0022-1996(96)01446-8