منابع مشابه
Strategic Teaching and Learning in Games
It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games that a player has an incentive to adopt, that would be evolutionary stable or that “could learn itself”. Rath...
متن کاملSophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games
Most learning models assume players are adaptive (i.e., they respond only to their own previous experience and ignore others' payo® information) and behavior is not sensitive to the way in which players are matched. Empirical evidence suggests otherwise. In this paper, we extend our adaptive experienceweighted attraction (EWA) learning model to capture sophisticated learning and strategic teach...
متن کاملSophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games
1 This research was supported by NSF Grants SBR 9730364 and SBR 9730187. Many thanks to Vince Crawford, Drew Fudenberg, David Hsia, John Kagel, and Xin Wang for discussions and help. Helpful comments were also received from seminar participants at Berkeley, Caltech, Harvard, Hong Kong UST, and Wharton. Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, Cal...
متن کاملUsing games in Oncology Teaching
Introduction:Educational methods can be classified into two groups: active methods and passive ones. Applying games is an active approach in teaching. The present study aimed at investigating the effect of games on teaching oncology. Methods: Twenty three medical students participated in the study. They took two class sessions of oncology. In the first session the basic principles and concepts...
متن کاملLearning in games with strategic complementarities revisited
Fictitious play is a classical learning process for games, and games with strategic complementarities are an important class including many economic applications. Knowledge about convergence properties of fictitious play in this class of games is scarce, however. Beyond games with a unique equilibrium, global convergence has only been claimed for games with diminishing returns (V. Krishna, 1992...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2594193