منابع مشابه
Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider problem is so severe that the equilibrium number of experiments is at most one plus the number of ex...
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We consider a multi-armed bandit model in which two players choose between learning about the quality of a risky option (modelled as a Poisson process with unknown arrival rate), and competing for the use of a single shared safe option that can only be used by one agent at the time. Firstly, when players cannot reverse their decision to switch to the safe option, the socially optimal policy mak...
متن کاملStrategic Experimentation in Networks
This paper examines experimentation and innovation when experimental results diffuse along social links. This public-goods nature of experimentation is a feature of many areas of economics, such as consumer choice, research and development, and agriculture. The paper asks: How do different patterns of social and geographic links affect experimentation? Who experiments and who free rides? Do mor...
متن کاملStrategic Experimentation in Queues
We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either: a geometric random variable in the good state, or zero in the bad state. The queue lengthens with each new arrival and shortens if t...
متن کاملStrategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use stationary Markovian strategies with posterior beliefs as the state variable. After characterizing the uniq...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.4.74