Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1554-964X,1554-9658
DOI: 10.1007/s10836-005-1110-7