منابع مشابه
Strategic Trade and Delegated Competition∗
Strategic trade theory has been criticized on the grounds that its predictions are overly sensitive to modeling assumptions. Applying recent results in duopoly theory, this paper considers three-stage games in which governments choose subsidies, firms’ owners choose incentive schemes for their managers, and then the managers compete in the product market. We show that if firms’ owners have suff...
متن کاملEvidence on Imperfect Competition and Strategic Trade Policy 1 What Is Strategic Trade Theory ? 2
Strategic trade theory shows that government intervention in markets with small numbers of traders can boost the welfare of a country relative to free trade. This survey critically assesses the empirical evidence regarding this possibility. One finding is that while many international food and agricultural markets are characterized by oligopoly, price-cost markups tend to be small, and the pote...
متن کاملStrategic Trade Policy under Uncertainty
This paper extends the Brander-Spencer (1985) model by considering market uncertainty, exploring nonlinear policy, and examining ̄rms' choices of strategic variables. By investigating the interrelationship between trade policy and market conduct, we ̄nd that unlike the oftenstudied linear policy, a nonlinear policy can in°uence the domestic ̄rm's choice of strategic variables and hence alter th...
متن کاملVertical structure and strategic environmental trade policy
The idea that environmental trade policy can be used to achieve competitive advantage in international markets has important implications for the way we conceive free trade. This paper considers strategic environmental policy in a model that makes explicit the vertical structure that supports production of the traded good. Including intranational vertical relationships in the analysis of strate...
متن کاملInformation and disclosure in strategic trade
We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms, we examine firms’ incentive to disclose information to the governments in the Brander-Spencer setting. With quantity competition, we find firms disclosing both demand and cost information,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1542-0485
DOI: 10.2202/1542-0485.1093