Strategic Judicial Preference Revelation

Preference Revelation in Multi-Attribute Bidding Procedures: An Experimental Analysis

In this paper, the authors report on a computer-based laboratory experiment investigating whether disclosing the buyer’s preferences in a multi-attribute reverse English auctions affects buyer’s utility, suppliers’ profits and efficiency. The results show that full revelation of the buyer’s preferences significantly increases allocational efficiency. Suppliers use the additional information in ...

Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judicial Preference Change

We are fond of putting our judges into neat adjectival boxes, particularly when they sit on the Supreme Court. These typologies often reflect perceived attitudinal or ideological preferences; some Justices are called “liberal” or “conservative” or “moderate,” or occasionally some hyphenated combination thereof. Or the labels might seek to capture variations in jurisprudential philosophy or meth...

Judicial Agenda Setting Through Signaling and Strategic Litigant Responses

STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITY: a revealed preference analysis

Extended Abstract: The most familiar setting for revealed preference analysis is that of consumer demand. In that context, Afriat’s Theorem (1967) gives necessary and sufficient conditions on a collection of observations to be consistent with the maximization of a monotone utility function, where each observation consists of a price vector and a demand bundle. Afriat’s Theorem is the starting p...

Strategic Diffusion of Information and Preference Manipulation

This paper bridges the existing gap between the empirical consumer choice literature and the theoretical structures built to account for information manipulation between a sender and a decision maker. The authors define a theoretical structure that allows for the analysis of preference manipulation in multiattribute environments via information multifunctions when the information transmitted is...