Strategic Inventories under Limited Commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic inventories under limited commitment
In a dynamic storable good market where demand changes over time, we investigate the producer’s strategic incentives to hold inventories in response to the possibility of buyer stockpiling. The literature on storable goods has demonstrated that buyer stockpiling in anticipation of higher future prices harms the producer’s profitability, particularly when the producer cannot commit to future pri...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3014388